Impact of Economic Reform on Labor Market Outcomes in China

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Over the past 30 years China has had unprecedented economic growth as a result of market-oriented reforms initiated in the late 1970s. Since then, labor market reforms have moved China from a state-assigned employment and centrally-determined wage system to an increasingly market-driven system and has enabled 145 million farmers to move to cities. Despite remarkable changes, inherited institutional impediments still play an important role in the allocation of labor and are becoming increasingly important in determining Chinese economic, social and political future. This paper documents the most significant labor market reforms, describes current trends in various labor market outcomes, and discusses future challenges.

China has two segregated economies: the rural and urban. Understanding the shifting nature of this divide is probably the key to understanding the impacts of the most important labor market reform of the last decades and the decades ahead. From the late 1940s when the Communist Party rose to power, the Chinese economy was divided with virtually no labor mobility allowed between the two sectors. As a result of low agricultural productivity and the need to ensure food provision for cities, which were deemed essential for industrialization, the majority of the population was kept on farms (Perkins and Yusuf, 1984; Meng, 2000). In the countryside employment and income were linked to the commune based production system. Collectively owned communes provided basic cover for health, education, and pensions. In cities, state-assigned life-time employment, centrally-determined wages, and a cradle-to-grave social welfare system was implemented.

Rural-urban segregation was enforced by a household registration system called hukou, which restricted those born in rural areas from moving to cities. During the first 30 years of the Communist regime, more than 80% of the population lived in the countryside. Today, the hukou system still prevails, and still restricts labor mobility, though to a lesser extent, and 72% of the population is still identified as rural hukou holders.

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3 Individuals born in rural areas get “Agriculture hukou” while those born in cities get “Non-Agricultural hukou”. For simplicity, they are referred to as rural and urban hukou. The only ways one could change hukou status before economic reform were through (i) obtaining a tertiary degree; and (ii) joining the People’s Liberation Army and be promoted to first lieutenant or above. Recently some cities have allowed rural hukou holders to obtain urban hukou by purchasing housing in the city, but the cases are rare.
In the late 1970s, rural reforms began in one poor village initially as a grassroots reaction to extreme poverty. Hungry farmers secretly reallocated commune-owned land and assumed household responsibility for land taxes and commune dues and the remaining output flowing to the households rather than the commune. The clearly-defined household responsibility curbed the free-rider problem that had plagued the commune system and was an instant success. The central government recognized the potential implications for China's agriculture productivity and introduced the "household responsibility" system to the whole rural sector.

Within a few years in the early 1980s communes were abolished and farmers became self-employed individuals. Agricultural productivity increased significantly and by the mid 1980s rural under-employment became serious and per capita real income growth stagnated. Restrictions on rural-urban migration were still strictly enforced and farmers were encouraged to set up rural Township-and-Village-enterprises (TVEs) to absorb the surplus labor and to increase income. Rural TVEs were extremely successful but faced natural limits because of distance from resources and product markets.

During the 1980s, limited rural-urban migration began even though city governments continued to push migrants back to the countryside (Wang and Wang 1995; Xiang 1996; Zhao 2000; West and Zhao 2000; Meng 2000). The significant change in migration came in the late 1990s when economic growth in the cities accelerated, large amounts of FDI generated significant demand for unskilled labor, and local governments gradually reduced migration restrictions. Between 1990 and 1997, rural migrants working in cities increased from 25 million to 37 million, but by 2009 the numbers more than tripled to reach 145 million.

Urban economic reforms began at a later stage and at a much slower pace. Before the reform virtually all employment was in the state or collective sectors, hereafter referred to as the state sector. The China Statistical Yearbook reported a mere 150,000 self-employed in 1978, accounting for 0.16% of the total urban labor force (NBS, 2010). Individuals were assigned to jobs; employers were not allowed to hire or fire; and wages were determined by the Central Planning Commission. Life-time employment and centrally-determined wages reduced mobility and incentives, which, in turn, lead to overstaffing, shirking, and low productivity (Meng, 2000).

Urban labor market reforms in the 1980s began by allowing state enterprises to pay piece rates and bonuses, and some attempts were made to reduce life-time employment. However, these reforms were measured and only marginally affected labor mobility and incentives. Real changes occurred when the private sector was allowed to develop, which occurred essentially as a reaction to an unexpected shock. In the early 1980s, hundreds of thousands of `sent-down youth'\(^5\) from the Cultural Revolution era returned to cities. However, there were few jobs available and large numbers became unemployed. This was the first time under the communist regime that the urban economy experienced large scale open unemployment. The government responded by encouraging self-employment for the first time (Feng, 2002).

\(^5\) During the early years of the Cultural Revolution, tens of millions of urban high school aged children had no school and no job to go to. To resolve the employment problem, Mao sent a large proportion of them to the countryside to work.
The next and a more important turning point for private sector development occurred with state sector restructuring initiated from the mid 1990s, when more than 40% of state-owned enterprises were making losses and central government could no longer bail them out. In 1997 the government introduced a new policy (Hold on to the large, let go of the small), which aimed at maintaining the largest 1000 state-owned enterprises and pushing smaller ones into the market place to compete with non-state firms, while allowing all remaining loss-making state firms to go bankrupt. Within three to four years tens of millions of the state sector workers were made redundant and the private sector began to expand quickly (Meng, 1997; Fan, 2000; Appleton, Knight, Song, and Xia, 2002; Meng, 2004; and Giles, Park, and Cai, 2006). The labor market for those with urban hukou began to be transformed.

This paper puts aside reforms within the rural sector and focuses mainly on the urban labor market transformation and rural-urban migration. A major difficulty in analyzing these large changes is lack of data. China does not have a labor force survey that covers the population. In the past when the communes employed those with rural hukou and the state sector employed those with urban hukou, aggregated employment and earnings statistics were collected via administrative reporting systems. Economic reform changed employment institutions and thus substantially weakened data collection coverage. Although the Statistical Yearbooks still publish aggregated data, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) relies heavily on rules of thumb and assumptions to put data together, and every five to ten years, the population survey or census data are used to make adjustments. Different Yearbooks, therefore, often provide different figures and trends. At the micro level, NBS conduct two major nationally representative household surveys: the Rural Household Survey (RHS) and the Urban Household Survey (UHS) based on hukou status and aimed at collecting detailed income and expenditure information. The former has only been made available to a limited number of academics for a couple of years and a few provinces at a time; while the latter do not include migrant workers in cities. There are also censuses and population survey data, which normally do not have earnings, or detailed labor market information. Thus, labor market analysis based on official data is limited.

There are essentially four major non-official household surveys that have been used for labor market research: China Income Project Surveys (CHIPs, repeated cross-sections for year 1988, 1995, 1999, and 2002, covers around 15,000 rural and urban households in 11 provinces and in 2002 it also includes 2000 migrant households); China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS, panel, 1989, 1991, 93, 97, 2000, 02, 04, 06 covers 7 provinces total of 4400 households, including rural and urban samples, but without migrants); and China Urban Labor Survey (CULS, repeated cross-sections for 2001 and 2005, covers 5 cities with less than 3000 households, including urban and migrant households). These surveys either ignore or do not have a representative migrant sample (Gong, Kong, Li, and Meng, 2008).

In 2008 the Rural-Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI) project was initiated, which comprises three samples in China: the rural hukou households (8000), the urban hukou households (5000), and the migrant households (5000). The surveys of urban and migrant

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6 The 1999 CHIPs only covers 6 provinces.
households are conducted in 15 cities, while the rural household surveys are conducted in 9 provinces. Differing from the previous household surveys, RUMiCI migrant survey is based on a sampling frame constructed by the RUMiCI team which conducted census of migrants via workplaces in the survey cities. It closely resembles the labor market characteristics of migrants in the 1% Population Survey of 2005.7

The principal data sources used in this paper are the Urban Household Survey (UHS) for the year 1988 to 2009;8 the 1% sample of the Population Census of 2000; the 1% Population Survey of 2005; the Rural Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI) Project data; and the aggregated data from China Statistical Yearbooks.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section analyses the effect of economic reform on urban labor market outcomes and discusses the remaining tensions within this market. Section 3 discusses the most important change in China’s labor market over the past two decades: the large scale rural-to-urban migration and challenges generated by the interactions between the migration and the current institutional restrictions. Section 4 predicts the future of the Chinese labor force, both in terms of quantity and quality. Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses the potential impact of current labor market conditions and challenges for China’s future economic growth.

The impact of urban labor market reform

Employment and unemployment

Communist orthodoxy states that all people of workforce age should contribute to the common good by being employed. Thus, in pre-reform China almost all able-bodied adults were employed. Economic reform challenged this orthodoxy. It gradually privatized a large portion of the state sector, gave rise to the possibility of unemployment, encouraged labor mobility, changed incentive systems, and created the possibility for workers to choose where and whether they wanted to work (see Meng, 2000; Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2009; and Maurer-Fazio, Connelly, Chen, and Tan, 2010).

Figure 1 illustrates the large employment and unemployment changes that have occurred.9 In 1988, the employment rate for urban hukou holders, aged 16 to 64, was 83% and 75% for men and

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7 For detailed information on RUMiCI sampling, sample size, and other related issues, see Gong et. al., 2008; or http://cbe.anu.edu.au/schools/eco/rumici/.
8 The UHS data used in this paper are from 16 out of 31 provinces. Using the full sample for the 1988 to 2001 period do not change any of the results presented in this paper.
9 The data used in this sub-section mainly come from the UHS survey. The employment information inquired in the survey does not follow the standard Labor force survey questions. Thus, the definition of employment and unemployment used here differ somewhat from the western standard. For employed people the survey asks the current occupation as well as annual earnings. For people who are not working, they need to provide reasons from the following choices: 1) unemployed; 2) waiting to be assigned to a job; 3) disabled; 4) retired; 5) students; 6) waiting for further education; 7) housekeeping; and 8) not otherwise specified. The employed is defined as those who are currently working and with a positive annual earnings, while the unemployed include categories 1 and 2 in the not working choice set as well as employed but did not report a positive annual earnings. The latter group account for 0.4-1.4% of the total labor force across different years. The unemployment figure only include categories 1 and 2.
women, respectively. The OECD averages in the same year were significantly below these levels at 77.3% for men and 52.4% for women (OECD, various years). A distinctive feature of the command system was the high employment rate of women.

Employment rates began to change from the mid 1990s, especially for women. By 2002, they fell to 76% and 62% for men and women respectively, which are closer to but still above OECD averages of 65% and 55%, respectively (OECD, 2010). After 2002, the rate for men has hovered around the 2002 levels, while for women it fell further but at a slower pace than during the previous period. The timing of the significant reduction in employment coincided closely with state sector restructuring, which led to large-scale retrenchment.

The unemployment figures, however, do not reflect the significant impact of the state sector restructuring between the mid 1990s and the early 2000s, even though there is a widespread agreement that this period involved a large scale job losses (Appleton et al., 2002; Giles et. al., 2006; and Cai et. al., 2009). In particular, the figure shows that during the second half of the 1990s the unemployment rate stayed at a low level and it was not until the early 2000s that there is a large increase in unemployment.

Perhaps the lack of a measured unemployment in the mid to late 1990s is related to the evolution of the Chinese unemployment support system. At the beginning of the state-sector restructuring there was no official social security payment for unemployed workers. Instead, most laidoff or retrenched workers received severance pay and unemployment support from their original state enterprises. Many regarded it as a temporary layoff. Thus, when the UHS was conducted during those years many might not have reported themselves as being unemployed. Indeed, in CHIPS 1995 there were two questions regarding unemployment. When individuals were asked their current labor force status, which is the same question in UHS, only 3.2% reported being unemployed, while after asking whether their enterprises were making losses, they were again asked whether they were unemployed. This time 7.7% of those who answered as being employed in the first place reported as being unemployed. This suggests a total unemployment rate of 10.3%. In other words, the real unemployment rate for the mid 1990s to the early 2000s should be much higher than implied by UHS data in Figure 1.10 Panel B of Figure 1 also presents the average unemployment rate for the total labor force for the year 1995 and 1999 to 2001, which are reported from the CHIPS and CULS surveys, where detailed unemployment questions were asked. These unemployment rates are much higher than those indicated in UHS data for the same period.

The centralized unemployment support system was not formally established until the early 2000s. Since then, laidoff workers no longer collect their unemployment support payment from enterprises but collect them from central security payment offices. Hence, there should be less confusion regarding the definition of unemployment. Thus, in the 2000s, we observe a sharp increase in unemployment recorded in the UHS data, especially for women.

10 Consequently, the employment rate presented in Panel A of Figure 1 should be an over-estimate.
11 The first Unemployment Insurance Act was issued in 1999 (see http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/04/content_20258.htm).
To understand why the employment rate has dropped so much and who suffered the most in terms of unemployment, Figure 2 presents these rates by age and gender, for three different years (1988, 2002, and 2007). For both men and women the major employment reductions occurred in younger age groups. For example, in 1988, 60% of 18 year-old males were employed. By 2002 this proportion had fallen to 5.3% and by 2009, 3%. As in the west, employment declines among the young have led to increases in unemployment rates among this group, but have been mainly associated with rapid and widespread education expansion. In 1988 around 30% of 16 to 24 years old were at school or waiting to continue their schooling, by 2009 the ratio had increased to 70%. Nevertheless, unemployment among 25-29 years old has also increased significantly and by 2002 it amounts to 14% and 17% for men and women, respectively.

There has also been a decline in employment among the old. This decline occurred for men mainly in their 50s. Employment for men aged 55 to 65 reduced from 57% in 1988 to 45% in 2007. For women the decline occurred in their late 40s onward. 51% of 45-65 years old women was employed in 1988 and by 2007 the ratio dropped to 39%. The unemployment rates for these groups are quite low, though. Many have argued that this change in employment among older workers resulted from the discouraged worker effect of economic restructuring (Appleton et. al., 2002; Giles et. al., 2006; and Maurer-Fazio et al, 2010).

For women, though, the young and old are not the full story, since there is also an across-board reduction in the employment rate for prime-aged women. For example, in 1988, 98% of the women aged 30 to 40 were working, but by 2002, the employment ratio reduced to just above 85%, and recovered only slightly by 2007 to 87%. The unemployment rate for prime-aged women has stayed around 10 percent throughout the 2000s.

Maurer-Fazio et al (2010) suggest that some of the reduction in female employment is related to an increase in household income and housing availability, both of which have reduced co-residing with parents, which, in turn, has increased women’s responsibilities for their nuclear families and hence reduced their labor supply. Women now have more discretion to choose whether to participate or not and the social stigma associated with not working has gradually disappeared. Perhaps lack of job flexibility in the work place is also important. Part-time employment is rare in China, even for women. Based on CHIPS 1995, 2002, and RUMiCI urban sample 2008, the proportion of employed women working less than 35 hours weekly was 7.2%, 6.5% and 6.9%, respectively. However, for prime-aged women, the high unemployment rates during the economic restructuring period and beyond indicate that employment changes may not be only a supply side story.

The literature has examined thoroughly the effect of the economic restructuring on women’s unemployment (Appleton et. al., 2002; Giles et. al., 2006; and Maurer-Fazio et al, 2010), but has not documented and analyzed the high female unemployment rate for the period beyond the economic restructuring. It is surprising to see that even in the highest economic growth period

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32 Although the unemployment rate for this age group is extremely high, due to the small sample size of the employed within the age group, it is difficult to comment conclusively.
there is persistent unemployment among women. A probit model is estimated which shows that at every age group women are much more likely to be unemployed than men. The differences are particularly large for 30-49 years old groups with 8.6 to 9.7 percentage points differences, which are larger than the predicted average unemployment probability for women (8.4%). Getting a college or above degree is particularly useful in reducing the probability of being unemployed for women relative to men. Evaluated at the mean value, there is a 2.2 percentage point difference.13

Another important aspect of change in employment is the ownership structure. During the pre-reform and the early reform periods, the majority of the urban employed worked in the state sector and as late as 1991 more than 97% of urban hukou workers were state sector employees.14 It was not until the mid to late 1990s that a clear reduction in State employment started to occur, falling from 95% in 1995 to just above 81% in 2001. By 2008-09 the ratio further dropped to about 50%.

Who lost state sector jobs? A probit model for each year between 1988 and 2009 is estimated to answer this question.15 Figure 3 shows the marginal effects by year and indicates that in the early years there was no impact of education, age, or gender but the situation begins to change as reform progresses. It becomes noticeable that increasingly the state sector employs better educated male workers. In addition older workers are more likely to be hired in the state sector. Thus at the end of the period, 62% of the 50 years old were employed in the state sector, while the proportion for the 20 years old is only 20%.

It is interesting that the reforms have shifted less educated, younger females out of the state to the private sectors (or stopped them entering the state sector). A priori one might have expected that more educated and young males would have moved to the private sector and that the private sector would have been able to pay higher wages to attract them. This leads to the next section, which investigates changes in the wage structure including the differential reward systems in the state and private sectors.

Wage structure and inequality
Between 1988 and 2009, Chinese real annual earnings for urban hukou workers increased from 3,880 yuan to 19,674 yuan, a fivefold increase.16 Such a dramatic increase in earnings is accompanied by an equally dramatic change in the wage structure.

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13 The regression pools 2002-2009 data and the independent variables include nine five-year age group dummies, education, provincial dummies, and year dummies, a female dummy and it interaction terms with all the other independent variables. The results are available upon request from the author. These regression results, however, do not indicate why women are more likely to be unemployed. Future research in this area is required.
14 The survey categories ownership of employment into five groups: 1. State, 2. Collective, 3. Private (including self-employment), 4. Other ownership (including joint venture, foreign owned, and share-holding companies), and 5. those who are not otherwise specified, including domestic maids, childcare workers, and others. The categories 1 and 2 are grouped as the ‘state’; 3 and 4 as ‘private’, and 5 as ‘other’.
15 The independent variables included in these regressions are age and its squared term, gender, education, and provincial dummy variables.
16 Data used in this subsection come from the UHS 1988-2009 and the wage variable excludes the top and bottom 1% of observations.
In the pre-reform era, there were two separate wage ranks: blue and white collar workers. Apart from slight regional variations in heating subsidies, the whole nation followed the same wage system (Meng, 2000 and Huang, 2004).

The earliest data available (1981) suggest that education and potential work experience were rewarded but the education return was extremely low and the experience-earnings profile was very important and virtually a straight upward sloping line. Experience, education, and occupation variables explained 64% of the earnings variation, a level not seen in western country earnings equations, indicating the dominance of the administratively determined wage structure (Meng and Kidd, 1997).

As reforms proceeded the administratively determined wage system weakened, partly because of the increase in private sector employment, where wages are determined in the market place, and partly due to competition between private and state sectors, which pushed the state sector to change its reward system to be more incentive driven. There has been a significant increase in education returns and reductions in returns to experience during the 1990s, and state sector restructuring played an important part in these changes (Appleton, Song, and Xia, 2005 and Zhang, Zhao, Park, and Song, 2005). Using UHS data this paper updates the trend in wage structure changes in the urban sector during the past 22 years.

Figure 4 presents the changing impact of observable characteristics on log annual earnings between 1988 and 2009. The experience-earnings profiles have continued to flatten significantly over the period, although more slowly recently. Returns to college and above education have risen from around 16% at the beginning of the period to over 50% by 2003, but since then have slowed down and even slipped back slightly. This may be related to the large influx of graduates into the labor market due to the 1999 university expansion discussed later in the paper. The gender earnings differential has been worsening continuously over the entire period. Women used to earn around 7% less than men. By 2009 the gap had widened to around 23% less. Recall that over the same period, women’s employment rate also reduced sharply. Perhaps increased labor market discrimination played a role in discouraging women from working. Finally, controlling for workers’ quality, the state sector paid significantly less than the private sector in the 1990s, but this has turned around in the 2000s. In 2002 as part of the fight against corruption the state introduced the public servant examination system and increased public sector pay substantially. Since then state sector pay has been about 20% higher than the private sector, not to mention that it also offers significantly higher social insurance and other benefits.

As the wage structure changes, so does the relative importance of different contributing factors change. One way to illustrate this, is to follow Dickens and Katz (1987) and compare the adjusted-

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17 The regressions include the following independent variables: three categories of education (3-year college and above, senior high school and junior high school with the omitted category as primary school); nine categories of work experience (0-4, 5-9,...,>=40); a dummy indicating employed in the state sector; seven occupational dummies, a female dummy and full provincial dummy variables.
$R^2$ from regressing the log real annual earnings on each of the characteristics alone. The most striking change over the 22 years is the fading dominance of work-experience in explaining the earnings variation (Figure 5). In 1988 work experience alone explained 30% of wage variation, and by the end of the data period it only explained around 3%, with the major changes occurring in the 1990s.

The second interesting feature is the changing contribution of education, which is completely opposite to that of experience. In 1988, 2% of the wage variations was explained by education, and in 2009 the adjusted-$R^2$ increased to 13.3%. While the contribution from occupation and ownership of employment were higher than the contribution of education at the beginning of period, the effect of education surpassed them by the end of the period.

Another feature is the contribution of provincial dummy variables, which were the dominant influence on wage outcomes during the mid 1990s but have now shifted back to a similar level of contribution to that observed during the early reform era. China has always had significant regional price and wage variations, particularly in the 1990s when regional protectionism was at its peak (Young, 2000; Jiang and Li, 2005; Fan and Wei, 2006; Brandt and Holz, 2006; Gong and Meng, 2009).

Finally, it should be noted that the proportion of explained wage variation over time has fallen dramatically. At the beginning of the period the adjusted-$R^2$ for the full model is around 43%, by the end of the period it has fallen to 28%, similar to the amount of wage variations which can be explained by individual characteristics in most western countries, indicating a switch away from an administratively determined wage system.

Accompanying the increase in earnings and the changing wage structure, wage inequality has increased dramatically among the urban population. Between 1988 and 2009, the Gini coefficient for real annual wages increased from 0.26 to 0.38, while the variance of the log real annual earnings increased from 0.36 to 0.54. The most significant increase in earnings inequality occurred during the 1990s’ when state-sector restructuring was prominent, regional earnings variation was at its peak, returns to experience were falling, and returns to education began to increase significantly. In the 2000s when returns to education stopped growing and regional earnings variation stabilized, the increase in earnings inequality ceased.

The substantial increase in inequality during the 1990s was mainly driven by the disproportional increase in the earnings of the top half of the distribution (Park, Song, Zhang, and Zhao, 2003; Li, Zhao, and Lu, 2007; and Meng et al., 2009). Figure 6 presents the ratios of 90th to 10th, 90th to 50th, and 10th to 50th deciles. Over the 22 years, the 90th to the 10th decile ratio increased 2-fold from 3 to 6 times. In the 1990s both the increase in the 90/50 ratio and the reduction in the 10/50

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$^{18}$ The idea is to derive a bounded range for the contribution of each characteristic to wage determination. The lower bound is derived by examining the increase in explanatory power by adding each of the characteristics into the regression already including the other set of regressors. The upper bound of the range is found by regressing log real annual earnings on each of the characteristics alone. The pattern for the lower bound adjusted-$R^2$'s is very similar to that presented in Figure 5 but at a lower level. The figure is available upon request from the author.
ratio contributed to the rapid inequality increase. Although the total inequality has not increased much in the 2000s, the increase in the ratio of the 90/50.

Li et al. (2007) find that education was an equalizing force during the period 1988 to 1997, but became a driving force for earnings inequality between 1997 and 2003. Meng et al. (2009) decompose earnings inequality between 1988 and 2007 and find that the dominant factor driving the significant increase in the earnings variance in the 1990s was an increase in the price of unobserved skills. They conjecture that when an economy shifts from an administratively determined wage system to a market-oriented one, rewards to both observed and unobserved skills increase. In the mid 2000s, because of the late 90s college expansion, the increase in returns to both observed and unobserved skills has plateaued.

Studies on wage inequality among urban hukou workers have naturally excluded rural-to-urban migrants. Given that migrants is a large share of the urban workforce now and are mainly in the lowest earnings group, it might be expected that including migrants would produce more wage inequality in cities. However, this is not the case. RUMICl data show that the Gini coefficient of monthly earnings in 2008 for urban workers alone is 0.38, while for migrant workers it was a very low 0.23. Combining migrants with urban workers gives an overall Gini coefficient of 0.34. Although individual earnings inequality reduces when migrant workers are added to the sample, inequality between the two groups is large and the sparse evidence available suggests that it is increasing.

**Rural-urban migration**

Perhaps the most important labor market change over the past two decades is the rapid growth in rural-to-urban migration. In the past 12 years the number of rural migrants increased by more than 100 million to 145 million, almost half of the size of the US current population. It is expected that in the next couple of decades more than 300 million rural hukou workers will move to cities to work. The world has never seen such a large scale human movement within such a short time before and this large scale movement of workers from the low productivity agriculture sector to the high productivity urban sector is, perhaps, one of the most important driving forces of Chinese unprecedented economic growth (Bowworth and Collins, 2008 and Gong et. al., 2008).

Despite their contributions to economic growth, migrants are discriminated against in cities. Migration in China follows a ‘guest worker’ system with controls over the type of jobs rural migrants are allowed to have and the social welfare and social services migrants are entitled to. Like illegal immigrants in the U.S., rural migrants often take jobs which urban people are unwilling to take (Zhao, 2000; West and Zhao, 2000; Meng, 2000; and Meng and Manning, 2010). For a long time, migrants had no access to unemployment supports, health care, and retirement pensions; their children were denied access of urban public schools. Even now migrants do not have access to the Minimum Living Allowance scheme available to urban hukou holders as a last resort for poverty alleviation in urban areas.

Although the central government has recently introduced new laws and regulations to protect migrants' benefits and to increase their access to urban services, these attempts have had limited
success (Meng and Manning, 2010). For example, RUMiCI data indicate that between 2008 to 2010 the proportion of migrant workers with access to unemployment insurance increased from 12% to 13.5%, while the ratio for workers with urban hukou increased from 60 to 66%. Similarly, the proportion of migrants with access to urban health insurance was 11% in 2010. For urban hukou workers the ratio was 87% (Frijter, Gregory, and Meng, 2011).

As a result of institutionalized discrimination, most migrants come to the cities alone, leaving their families behind in the rural villages. Migrants do not foresee a future in the cities. Rather, they hope to earn as much as possible before returning home (Meng and Manning, 2010). This has generated a relatively short duration of stay. Migrants normally go to cities in their late teens. For women marriage and childbearing are the natural returning-calls and they start to return home in large numbers between age 25-35, while men start returning in their mid 30s (Figure 7). On average migrants stay in cities for only 7 odd years. \(^{19}\) Figure 7 also shows that at the peak migration-age (25 for males and 20 for females) only 55% of male and 50% female rural labor force migrated. In total 22 percent of the rural labor force worked in cities in 2009. \(^{20}\)

**Migrant employment and occupation**

Since institutional restrictions discourage migrants from staying in cities when unemployed, observed employment rates are extremely high. The employment rate for migrants in 2009 was 94%, while for their urban hukou counterparts in the same cities it was 63% (Table 1). These striking differences extend to other labor market attributes. Migrants work an average of 63 hours per week, while their urban hukou counterparts work 44 hours, a 44% difference. Wage-earning migrants work 15 hours more on a weekly basis than their urban hukou counterparts, while for self-employed the difference is 20 hours per week.

High employment and low unemployment rates do not imply that migrants do not lose jobs. Because there is no unemployment benefit or health insurance for migrants, returning to the home village is their ‘fallback’ position after job loss. This was clearly evident when the Global Financial crisis hit China in mid 2008. At the end of 2008 as many as 20 to 45 million migrant workers returned to their home villages due to job loss and the unemployment rate increase in cities was muted (Huang, Zhi, Huang, Rozelle, and Giles, 2010 and MoHRSS, 2010; Kong, Meng and Zhang 2010).

When working in cities, few migrants are employed in the state sector, 7.3% in 2009, compared with 49.4% of urban hukou workers. Furthermore, migrants are more likely to be self-employed. In 2009, around 27% of employed migrants work as self-employed, compared with a mere 8.4% of

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\(^{19}\) Note that the length of stay is calculated using information on the year the migrant first moved to city and the calendar year of the survey. As we have no information on churning, this observed length of stay to the survey date is an over-estimate. In addition, this observed duration suffers from two potential biases. First, individuals who have completed their durations have left the city and cannot be observed. Second, the remaining individuals are those who have not completed their durations and hence are right censored. Assuming a constant exit rate and a steady state, the two biases may cancel out each other.

\(^{20}\) These data are from RUMiCI rural survey. The 145 million migrants number indicated earlier is aggregated figure published by NBS using RHS data, which gives a slightly higher proportion to around 27% of rural hukou labor force.
urban workers. Such a large gap in self-employment, in part, is a response to the discrimination against migrants in salaried sectors in terms of jobs attainment and earnings (Frijters, Kong, and Meng, 2011). For example, over 89% of the migrant workers are employed as unskilled workers (sales-service or production workers). The ratio for urban local workers is 40%.

What proportion of these large differences in occupational attainment is due to the difference in observable characteristics, such as age, gender and education of the migrant workers?

Migrants, on average, tend to be younger than their urban local counterparts by around 8 years. They are also more likely to be male and are less educated. Although the better educated rural workforce tend to migrate, they still have considerably less schooling (average of 9.2 years) relative to their urban hukou counterparts (average of 12.3 years) (Table 1). In particular, 42% of urban hukou workers have a 3-year college degree or above, while the proportion for migrant workers is around 6%, which is still higher than those who did not migrate. Over 50% of migrants only completed junior high school and the ratio for the non-migrated rural hukou labor force is even higher at above 60% (Figure 8).21

A linear probability regression is estimated to predict whether an individual has a skilled or unskilled job. Education, size of the social network in cities, and gender are all significantly associated with being a skilled worker. Controlling for all the observable characteristics, migrants are around 19 to 21% less likely to have a skilled job (see Table 2). This is true for both men and women, and indicates that over and above their attribute differences there is still a high level of disadvantage in the occupational choices that migrants face.

Migrant wage growth and labor market discrimination

Migrants have always been at the lower end of the wage distribution, earning, on average, only 45% of the average urban hukou workers' hourly wage in 2009 (Frijters, Gregory, and Meng, 2011).

It is unfortunate that there have not been any representative migrant surveys extending through the last decades to allow a comparison of changes in migrant earnings with those of their urban hukou counterparts. Nevertheless, RUMiCi asks migrants to report information on their first job in cities, including the year, the duration, the first and last month pay of the first job, as well as other employment details. Combining these data with that from the UHS survey, the monthly earnings of migrant and urban workers for the same 15 RUMiCi cities between 2002 and 2008 can be constructed.22 During this period the log monthly nominal earnings of the first month and last

---

21 Table 1 reports many other observable personal characteristics which may be associated with occupational choice, such as height, risk preference (self-assessed value between zero and ten, with zero indicating risk averse and ten risk loving), and size of social network in cities (number of people with urban hukou the individual sent a card, gift, or a text message to during the last Chinese New Year).

22 The reason only data for 2002 and after are used is to minimize recall errors and to increase the sample size for each year to around 300. Even so, there must be considerable doubt as to the precision of the migrant earnings data. To check whether the migrant earnings information is on a ballpark, I examined monthly earnings data from the CHIPS 2002 migrant survey. The data show that in 2002 average migrants were paid 783 yuan per month, while RUMiCi data for the first and last month pay of the first job is 685 yuan and 822 yuan, respectively. Both are on the right side of the distribution and are quite close to the mean, suggesting that recall errors should not be large.
month of the first job for migrants increased from 6.34 and 6.53 to 6.80 and 6.89, respectively, indicating a 6 and 4% nominal increase per annum, which is around one third of the increase for urban *hukou* workers, whose nominal earnings increased by 16.5% per annum during this period (Figure 9).

These changes in mean earnings also include the changed returns to observable characteristics. Regressing log monthly earnings against a vector of normal observable characteristics and a group of year dummies, which are interacted with a migration dummy variable, the coefficients on the year dummy variables for migrants and urban workers depict the earnings growth net of the change in returns to observable characteristics (Panel B of Figure 9). The implied growth rate for urban workers is around 10% per annum, and for migrants is between 4 to 5% per annum (see also Golley and Meng, 2011). Thus, both the raw data and the regression results suggest that wage gap between the two groups is increasing.

There are a number of conjectures that might explain the differential earnings growth between urban and migrant workers. First, the labor supply conditions for the two types of workers are very different. There is a limited supply of urban *hukou* workers due to the introduction of the One-Child policy (see next section). Job access and other restrictions placed on rural-urban migrants prevent them adding to the supply of the urban *hukou* group. Currently more than 70% of the population has rural *hukou* and of the rural *hukou* workforce only 22% are working in urban areas. The potential supply of migrant workers is significantly larger than for urban *hukou* workers, which should suppress wage growth. Second, there is a skill bias in demand which favors predominantly urban *hukou* workers as they are more educated than their migrant counterparts (Figure 8). Third, there is a discrimination element, as high paying jobs are restricted to urban *hukou* workers.

It is important to note that these three elements are all related to the long standing policy of a rural-urban divide: urban workers are protected from competition from rural labor supply; they are directly protected to obtain good jobs; and more implicitly, they receive better quality education and hence are able to reap the rewards from skill-biased technologies.

Studies generally find that labor market discrimination suppresses migrant wages and wage growth (Meng and Zhang, 2001; Zhang, 2009; Frijter, Lee, and Meng, 2011; and Frijter, Gregory, and Meng, 2011). In particular, Frijter, Gregory, and Meng (2011) show that in 1995 migrant workers in Shanghai earned 50% of urban workers' hourly earnings, and 47% of this gap could not be explained by differences in observed characteristics. The hourly earnings gap between the two groups in the same city increased to 60% by 2009, and 53% of the gap could not be explained by differences in observable characteristic. Wage differential and discrimination do not seem to be falling.

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23 Note that the earnings used here are monthly earnings. Because migrants on average work much longer hours (58 per week for migrant wage-salaried workers and 42 for urban workers), the differential in hourly earnings is much larger.

24 Regressors included are: age and its squared terms, city work experience and its squared terms, education levels, gender, a migrant dummy variable, regional dummies, and year dummy variables. All independent variables are interacted with the migrant dummy variable.
If migrants stayed longer in cities could they narrow the gap or "catch up" to urban workers? Zhang (2009) uses CHIPs 1999 and 2002 survey data and finds that there is a statistically significant and weak narrowing of the gap but no evidence of a complete catch-up. She also finds that the migrants' experience-earnings profile peaks around the 15-year mark. The RUMiCI 2008-2009 data produces similar results and suggests that migrant experience-earnings profile peaks at around 18 to 20 years. Recall that migrants on average only stay in cities for 7 years. Thus, most migrants leave cities well before their earnings peak. Discouraging migrants from staying in cities longer not only lowers migrant earnings but also disadvantages the economy by failing to allow migrants to reach their potential productivity peak.

**The future of the Chinese labor force: quantity and quality**

**The One-Child policy and the impact of institutional impediments on future labor supply**

When discussing China's future labor supply one cannot ignore the possible impact of the One-Child policy. The One-Child Policy was introduced in 1979 as the latest of a series of fertility control policies. At the end of the 1960s low agricultural productivity was raising concerns as to whether China could feed its ever-growing population. In response, the government began discussing "Malthusian population traps", and in 1973 a policy of "Later, Longer, and Fewer" was introduced. Then, in 1978 a new policy of "One is the Best and Two is the Most" and "Reward Having One Child and Punish Having Three" was introduced. In 1979 the "One-Child per Couple" policy was implemented (Center for Population Studies, CASS, 1986; and Peng, 1991; and Feeney and Wang, 1993).

The One-Child policy was strictly enforced in urban areas, but in rural areas a second child, or even a third, has always been allowed if the previous births are girls (Peng, 1991). The policy was associated with a total fertility decline from 2.8 in 1979 to 1.8 in 2000, and the total population reduction in the first 25 years of implementation, relative to what the population otherwise would have been, is believed to be in the range of 250 to 300 million people (Festini and de Martino 2007).

Figure 10 presents the total population pyramid as well as pyramids for those with rural or urban *hukou* for the year 2000. The two red horizontal lines indicate those who were born in 1973 (the introduction of the "Later, Longer, and Fewer" policy) and 1979 (the introduction of the "One-Child per Couple" policy). The most distinctive feature of the rural population pyramid is the low births between the early 1970s and mid 1980s. This is, however, not primarily the outcome of the One-Child policy. Instead, it is an "echo" effect of the Great Famine of the late 1950s. In fact, if we examine the pyramid for the rural *hukou* population, the cohorts after the "echo" effect are about the same size, if not larger than, the cohorts born immediately after the Great Famine, suggesting that the impact of the "One-Child" policy has not significantly reduced the reproduction of the rural *hukou* population. Figure 10 also shows that a new round of the "echo" effect is coming in

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25 The policy advocated having children later, having a longer spell between births, and having fewer children.
another decade or so. This can be seen from the shrinking of rural *hukou* population under 10 years of age. The reduction will not be huge, though. The current 0-10 years old rural *hukou* holders is 85%, 98% and 90% of the rural population aged 11-20, 21-30 and 31-40, respectively.

The urban population pyramid, however, depicts a different story as there appears to be a marked policy impact of the One-Child policy. Below the red lines, population size fell year after year so that the "pyramid" is in fact diamond shaped, indicating a shrinking urban *hukou* population size. The number of urban *hukou* population aged 0-10, for example, is 58% and 55% of the population aged 21-30 and 31-40, respectively.

Nevertheless, as more than 70% of the population has rural *hukou*, the limited effect of the One-Child policy on the rural population dominates the total population story. Based on United Nations' projections, the Chinese population will continue to grow until 2030 to 1.46 billion and decline to 1.41 billion by 2050 if there is only a very slight increase in fertility (United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Population Division, 2007). What is apparent from the population pyramids is that the new entrants in the labor force in the next decades will be predominantly rural *hukou* population.

Since 2004 there have been reports of migrant labor shortages in coastal Chinese cities. Media discussions often link these outcomes to the "One-Child" policy. There has also been debate as to whether China has reached the Lewisian "turning point", whereby rural labor supply is exhausted and unskilled wages in urban areas will begin to rise substantially (see, for example, Cai, 2007 and 2010; Golley and Meng, 2011; Knight, Deng, and Li, 2011; Yang, Chen, and Monarch, 2010). As discussed earlier, currently only 22% of the rural *hukou* labor force has migrated to cities. Combined with the short stay of migrants in cities, this suggests that there is considerable potential for labor supply increases from rural areas to the cities. If the duration of migration doubles, for example, the stock of migrant labor supply in cities would double and any conceivable "labor shortages" would disappear. Given the link between short duration and institutional restrictions on migration, the "labor shortages" currently observed in coastal regions is not actually a question of supply shortage generated by the lack of absolute numbers of potential workers, but rather a question of institutional restrictions.

One worrisome feature of the institutional restrictions is that if unchanged they may shorten China's labor intensive growth path and increase the rural-urban divide. If low skilled migrant workers cannot either go to cities or stay in cities as long as they wish, unskilled labor ‘shortage’ may worsen and migrant workers' wages in cities will increase in response to a labor supply reduction. This may induce capital outflow to other low-cost countries and Chinese industries will increasingly move to the capital and technology-intensive end of the spectrum. This process is already happening. But at the same time there still exists a large pool of unskilled labor under-employed in rural areas. The real challenge for China is whether it can change the institutional restrictions quickly enough to increase both the inflow of migrants and their length of stay in cities.

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26 Based on the same projection, if fertility were to increase by 0.5 child per woman, the population will continue to increase until 2050 to 1.65 billion. In fact an increase in fertility by 0.5 per woman is more likely to happen as many provinces have already allowed couples who are both a single child to have two children.
If the answer is no, then China needs to think carefully about how the 50% of unskilled farmers who are still in the rural areas can be employed to share in China’s economic growth. Will it be possible to change the education system so as to change the skill set of the future labor force from rural areas to fit the new industrial structure? This leads to the next question of quality of the future labor force.

**Polarization in education**

During the communist regime, China did very well in reducing illiteracy. At the end of the 1940s India and China faced similar educational challenges. By 1964 China’s literacy rate had increased to 48%, while India was at 28%. By 1978, the literacy rate for China increased to 66%, while India in 1981 was at 41%. Today, China’s literacy rate has increased to 96% (Dreze and Loh, 1995; Zhang, 1997 and Zhang and Kanbur, 2005).

Despite the high literacy rate, the rural-urban divide in education has enlarged since economic reform. Using 1% Population Survey of 2005 data Figure 11 presents the average years of schooling by birth cohorts and *hukou* status. The average schooling gap between urban and rural *hukou* holders fell from 4.8 years for the cohort born before the communists took over the power (the before 1940 cohorts) to around 3.6 years for the cohort born in the 50s and early 60s, and then gradually increased to over 4 years again for those who were born in the 70s. Wu (2011) also finds that there is an increase in senior high school enrolment gap between rural and urban *hukou* holders for cohorts born during the 1970s and 80s.

A number of factors may contribute to the enlargement of the rural-urban education divide. First, economic reform abolished the rural commune system and most of the rural services paid by communes, including education, deteriorated. During the early reform period, many teachers were not paid and many schools ceased operation. On the demand side, the introduction of the household responsibility system, the development of the rural Township and Village enterprises, and the opportunity to move to cities to work at different stages of economic reform increased the opportunity cost of going to school (Unger, 2002; Brown, 2006; and de Brauw and Giles, 2006).

Second, as reform deepened, the Chinese government did not adequately replace education provision in rural areas, but instead, moved towards a partially private funded education system. The central government spending on education as a proportion of GDP hovered between 2 to 3% (Tsang and Ding, 2005; Hannum, Behrman, Wang and Liu, 2008; Robertson and Xu, 2008; and Hannum and Park, forthcoming). The increasing share of local governments and private investments on education implies that the gap between rich and poor in education enlarged. During the same period the urban/rural income ratio increased from two-fold in the mid 1980s to 3.5 fold in the mid 2000s (NBS, various years). Consequently, access to more and higher quality education is becoming less equal across the urban and rural divide. Hannum and Park (forthcoming) find that even in a very poor rural setting, the education achievement of children is significantly affected by the wealth of their family. Frijters, Luo, and Meng (2010) also find a very strong association between school performance and income in both rural and urban areas in China.
Third, the policy to expand university enrolment since 1999 further increased the rural-urban education gap. In 1999, the government increased college enrolment by 40% in one year and thereafter the enrolment rate continued to increase at a similar rate. Within a matter of 10 years, from 1998 to 2007, university enrollment increased from 108 million to 565 million (NBS, various years). The proportion of urban hukou workforce aged 23 to 60 with 3-year college and above education increased from 12% in 1988 to just below 40% in 2009. The differential impact of this large expansion for the rural and urban divide has not been fully documented but Luo and Meng (2010) find that the provincial-level university enrollment rate is significantly and positively associated with the share of urban hukou population in different provinces. Every additional 1 percentage point increase in the share of urban hukou population increases the probability of university enrollment by 0.49 percentage points and this variable alone can explain 40% of the variation in university enrollment across different provinces. Li (2010) also finds that the probability of having a university education increases 6.5 fold if the father has urban hukou.

The increase in the urban-rural education divide has important implications for future Chinese economic growth patterns. Institutional restrictions on rural-urban migration have begun to shift China towards a capital and technology intensive industrial structure. If rural education investment increasingly lags behind that of the urban population, we may see a stagnation of the urbanization process, an increase in rural unemployment, and a further widening of the income gap.

The increase in the supply of college graduates, which has slowed down the increase in returns to education, may affect college enrollment rates in the short-run. However, in the long run this increase in the supply of skilled workers might have prepared China for the upgrading of industries along the value-added chain. Notwithstanding this increase in the educated labor force, the shrinking urban hukou population indicates that the key to China’s future growth is how fast China can narrow the rural-urban education divide.

**Concluding remarks**

China has experienced tremendous labor market changes over the past 30 or so years. Here are some stylized facts highlighted in this paper, which may be important in thinking ahead about China’s future labor market development. First, China has a shrinking urban hukou population, and in the future, labor market new entrants will come primarily from the rural hukou population. Second, the rural population is significantly less educated. Third, there are still considerable institutional restrictions on rural-urban migration —migrant job access and access to social welfare and social services in cities—and as a result, Chinese cities have begun to experience some unskilled labor shortages even though more than 50% of the labor force is still in the rural sector.

Future labor market outcomes and the Chinese economic growth path will depend in part on the speed of change in migration restrictions, and the rural-urban education divide.

Suppose there are no substantial policy changes on any of these fronts, then in the next 10 to 20 years we may observe a continued rapid increase in earnings for urban hukou holders and possibly an even faster earnings growth due to shrinking labor supply. Little change in institutional
restrictions on migration will continue to increase unskilled labor cost and shift employment
demand away from unskilled to skilled labor. The rural-urban income divide will increase.

What if job access discrimination against migrants breaks down, but nothing changes in terms of
the education divide and restrictions on migrant workers' social welfare and social services
accession? Then, some migrant workers can access "good" educated jobs, the wage growth of
urban hukou workers will slow down, and the wages of relatively skilled migrants will go up. But,
on average, the earnings gap between urban hukou and migrant workers will remain due to lack of
quality of education in the rural areas. However, if rural education is improved, eventually the
earnings gap between urban hukou and migrant workers may reduce as more rural hukou workers
move into good jobs previously restricted to those with urban hukou.

If restrictions on migrant access to social welfare and social services in cities are removed but
there is no change in job segregation, more migrants will flow into cities, they will stay longer and
earnings growth for migrants will be lower as their supply increases. This will extend China's labor
intensive industry driven growth longer, but continue to widen earnings gap in cities: migrants
gain more jobs at the expense of lower wage growth. If, in the meantime, China also adjust its
educational investment in rural areas and gradually increases the skill level of rural workers, it will
allow China to smoothly upgrade its employment structure to fit its resource allocation.

It seems inescapable from these thought experiments that China should simultaneously adopt
reforms on all fronts to enable a better utilization of its abundant resources and a smooth
transition to a more skill intensive economy. We can observe some adjustments already but
progress is slow. One reason stems from the Federal nature of Chinese government. The Central
government passes laws and states policy intentions but resources and implementation are local
government responsibilities. For example, a national law was passed requiring employers to pay
unemployment, health, and pension insurance for all of their migrant workers. However, local
governments had little incentive to enforce these laws because enterprise based insurances
increase labor cost and hence may have negative effect on local growth, which is not in the
interest of local governments. It is likely, therefore, that any real change to eliminate migration
restrictions and rural-urban education divide have to be driven and paid for by the central
government, but that implies the future labor market reform is increasingly inter-twined with
public finances.
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<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Urban hukou holders</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Labor force participation rate (%)</td>
<td>93.36</td>
<td>97.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Labor force employment rate (%)</td>
<td>91.66</td>
<td>96.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) % of employed work as self-employed</td>
<td>29.68</td>
<td>26.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Ownership of employment:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>8.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>92.02</td>
<td>87.21</td>
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<td>(5) Occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers incl. shop-owners</td>
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<td>Clerks</td>
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<td>Sales/service workers</td>
<td>60.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production workers</td>
<td>26.20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.35</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Age</td>
<td>31.43</td>
<td>32.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>(7) % are males</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Years of schooling</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>9.38</td>
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<td>(9) Education level:</td>
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<td>Primary</td>
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<td>Junior high</td>
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<td>Senior high</td>
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<td>3-year college</td>
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<tr>
<td>University or above</td>
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<tr>
<td>(10) Height</td>
<td>160.29</td>
<td>170.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>(11) Risk</td>
<td>3.83</td>
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<td>(12) City network size</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wage earners</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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## Table 2: Probit model on occupational attainment

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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>Males</td>
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<td>Migrant dummy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>[0.003]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age-Squared</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>[0.000]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.012]*</td>
<td>[0.017]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior high school</td>
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<td>0.084</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.013]**</td>
<td>[0.018]**</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-year college</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.367</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.016]**</td>
<td>[0.022]**</td>
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<td>University and above</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>0.516</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.018]**</td>
<td>[0.024]**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Height</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>[0.000]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size of the social network in cities</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.000]**</td>
<td>[0.000]**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.007]*</td>
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<td>How risk taking are you? 0=risk averse 10=risk loving</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you think most people can be trusted? 1=yes, 0=no</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>7351</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.34</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Source: RUMiCI Migrant and Urban Household Surveys 2009.
Figure 1: Employment and unemployment rates by gender

Panel A: Pop. Emp. Rate

Panel B: Unemp. Rate

Source: Panel A: UHS; Panel B: UHS for male and female curves; for total, 1995 data is from CHIPS 1995, author’s own calculation; 1999 (Appleton et al, 2002); 2000-2001 (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2010).

Figure 2: Employment and unemployment rates by gender and age

Panel A: LFP Rate: Males

Panel A: Unemp Rate: Females

Source: 1988-2009 UHS, Author’s own calculation.
Figure 3: Marginal effects of individual characteristics on state sector employment

Panel A: Education

Panel B: Dummy for females

Panel C: Age effect

Source: 1988-2009 UHS, Author’s own estimation results.

Figure 4: Effect of characteristics on earnings

Panel A: Education

Panel B: Females

Panel C: State Employment

Panel D: Work Experience

Source: 1988-2009 UHS, Author’s own estimation results.
Figure 5: The adjusted partial R-Squared from earnings regressions

Source: 1988-2009 UHS, Author’s own estimation results.

Figure 6: Urban wage inequality

Source: 1988-2009 UHS, Author’s own calculation.
Figure 7: Age distribution of rural labor force, by migration status and gender

Panel A: Rural Labor Males
Panel B: Rural Labor Females

Source: RUMiCI rural household survey

Figure 8: Educational distribution of migrants vs. urban local workers and rural non-migrants

Panel A: Education, Urban
Panel B: Education, Rural

Source: RUMiCI surveys, author’s own calculation.
Figure 9: Log monthly earnings of migrants and urban workers

Panel A: Mean wages

Panel B: Wages: Reg. coeff.

Source: RUMiCI and UHS surveys, author’s own calculation and estimation.
Figure 10: Population pyramid (1 percent of the Population Census, 2000)

Panel A: Total

Panel B: Rural

Panel C: Urban

Source: 1% sample of the 2000 Population Census data, author’s own calculation

Figure 11: Years of schooling urban vs. rural hukou holders

Source: 1% Population Survey, 2005; author’s own calculation and estimation.